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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the PKI project initiated part of the UAE 
national ID card program.  It primarily shows the operational model of the PKI implementation that is 
indented to integrate the federal government identity management infrastructure with e-government 
initiatives owners in the country. It also explicates the agreed structure of the major components in 
relation to key stakeholders; represented by federal and local e-government authorities, financial 
institutions, and other organizations in both public and private sectors. The content of this article is 
believed to clarify some of the misconceptions about PKI implementation in national ID schemes, and 
explain how the project is envisaged to encourage the diffusion of e-government services in the United 
Arab Emirates. The study concludes that governments in the Middle East region have the trust in PKI 
technology to support their e-government services and expanding outreach and population trust, if of 
course accompanied by comprehensive digital laws and policies. 
KEYWORDS 
E-government, E-service, PKI, Identity Management, ID Card. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many countries around the world have invested momentously in the development and 
implementation of e-government initiatives in the last decade. As of today, more and more 
countries are showing strong preference to develop “the 24-hour authority” [1] and the 
delivery of further self-service models via digital networks [2]. However, from a citizens 
angle, and although individuals with higher levels of education are in general more open to 
using online interactions,  there is a stronger preference among the majority for traditional 
access channels like in person or telephone-based interactions with government and private 
organisations, [2,3]. 
Our research shows that governments in most parts of the world have been challenged in 
gaining citizen engagement in the G2C transactions.  Our earlier study pointed to the fact that 
e-government initiatives around the world have not succeeded to go to the third and forth 
phases of e-government development [4,5] (see also Figure 1).  In this earlier study, we 
referred to the need of fundamental infrastructure development in order to gaining the trust of 
citizens, and hence expanding outreach and accelerating e-government diffusion. One of the 
key components we highlighted there was the development and integration of a government 
identity management system with PKI technology to enable stronger authentication of online 
users. 
 Figure 1.  Four Phases of e-Government – [6] 
The purpose of this article is to describe the UAE government approach of incorporating PKI 
into their ID card architecture.  It explains the major components of the project related to e-
government G2C progress. In doing so, we seek to make a contribution to the available 
research literature on the implementation of PKI in national identity management systems, 
and its role in the diffusion of e-government and outreach. This article is structured as 
follows.  Some background introduction on PKI is provided first. The UAE PKI project is 
introduced next, and a highlight is provided on its major components.  Some reflection is 
provided on key management considerations, before the paper is concluded. 
2. DIGITAL IDENTITIES AND PKI IN E-GOVERNMENT 
For the past ten years, governments around the world have been vitally concerned with the 
establishment of secure forms of identification and improved identity management systems, 
in order to ascertain the true identities and legitimacy of their population. Yet, many 
organizations both in public and private sectors still rely heavily on their own constructed 
models of relevant online identities, which are based on captured data from single or multiple 
sources and transforming them into own data structures within their information systems.  
With the revolution of digital networks, governments are realizing their roles to develop 
foundational infrastructure for digital identities. The term “digital identity” refers to a set of 
attributes and properties about an individual that are associated together and available in an 
electronic form to construct trusted digital credentials. 
Evidently, governments have long played an authoritative role in identity provision in the 
physical world, and are now faced with demands to establish digital societies and identities in 
order to support e-government and e-commerce initiatives.  It is the role of the government to 
associate digital identities to specific persons who will be authorised to perform certain 
actions in physical or digital forms.  
This association is facilitated through digital certificates and digital signatures that altogether 
construct the digital identity [7].  Thus many governments have considered PKI technology to 
establish and implement this binding through registration and digital certificate issuance 
process. In basic terms, PKI attaches identities to digital certificates for the purpose of 
assured, verifiable, and secure digital communications. 
Public key infrastructure commonly referred to as PKI is an Information Technology (IT) 
infrastructure and is a term used to describe the laws, policies, procedures, standards, and 
software that regulate and control secure operations of information exchange based on public 
and private keys cryptography [8]. Table 1 summarizes the primary elements that make up the 
PKI components. The term PKI is used in this article to refer to the comprehensive set of 
measures needed to enable the verification and authentication of the validity of each party 
involved in an electronic transaction. 
Table 1.  Basic PKI Components 
Component Description 
Digital Certificates Electronic credentials, consisting of public keys, which are used to sign and 
encrypt data. Digital certificates provide the foundation of a PKI. 
Certification 
Authoritie(S) – CAs 
Trusted entities or services that issue digital certificates. When multiple 
CAs are used, they are typically arranged in a carefully prescribed order 
and perform specialised tasks, such as issuing certificates to subordinate 
CAs or issuing certificates to users. 
Certificate Policy and 
Practice Statements 
Documents that outline how the CA and its certificates are to be used, the 
degree of trust that can be placed in there certificates, legal liabilities if the 
trust is broken, and so on. 
Certificate Repositories A directory of services or other location where certificates are stored and 
published. 
Certificate Revocation 
Lists (CRL) 
List of certificates that have been revoked before reaching the scheduled 
expiration date. 
 
PKI offers high levels of authentication of online users, encryption and digital signatures , 
which also support the maintenance of elevated echelons of data privacy, streamline 
workflow and enable access. The cornerstone of the PKI is the concept of private keys to 
encrypt or digitally sign information. One of the most significant contributions a PKI has to 
offer is non-repudiation. Non-repudiation guarantees that the parties involved in a transaction 
or communication cannot later on deny their participation.  
PKI, in general, has grown both more slowly and in somewhat different ways than were 
anticipated [7]. It has had some success stories in government implementations; the largest 
PKI implementation to date is the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) PKI 
infrastructure for the Common Access Cards program [9]. See Also Appendix-1. Many 
researchers pointed out the complexity of PKI, and that it is only sound in theoretical terms 
[10]. We definitely do not agree with those who claim that PKI cannot be practiced and yield 
effective results. As with any technology, PKI is not without its own security risks due to its 
complex architectures. Indeed, there is no bullet-proof technology that could provide us with 
a fault free solution and meet all of our security needs. 
In fact, studies conducted by academics and practitioners remain passionate about the 
promises of PKI to revolutionise electronic transactions (see for example: [4,5,8,11]. 
Undoubtedly, published studies in the existing literature contributed significantly to the 
development of the technology and explaining its benefits. Nonetheless, those studies are 
believed to remain very much handy to technical researchers. 
This is to say that although an awful lot of articles were written on this topic, they seem to be 
written to improve and develop theoretical frameworks while others tackle narrowed 
technological issues. See for example: [12-22]. 
Looking at these studies, we note that although such research efforts have been 
comprehensive in specific areas, they do not assume a standard or a uniformed PKI approach. 
Interestingly, some researchers pointed to the fact that this field lacks fundamental theories to 
guide the development of clear path for PKI practice in our world [23]. 
Others explain lack of adoption and wide failures in PKI industry to be due to not having 
enough PKI applications with clear business cases to support the roll out of the infrastructure 
[24]. Therefore, many implementations reported to have produced unnecessary costs when 
implemented without clear business cases [25]. Apparently, with the increasing complexity, 
the implementation of PKI systems becomes extremely challenging in light of the limited 
documented experiences that have included inefficient and short living implementations, with 
no clear ROI cases. 
3. MOTIVATION AND EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION OF THE WORK 
In the age of supercomputing, secure communication is becoming a need and a necessity. PKI 
is being recognized as an important security component in digital infrastructures to support 
authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. Organisations that deployed 
PKI have reported substantial economic savings [26]. Although PKI is reported to gaining 
wide popularity, it is still implemented in its very basic form and protocols e.g., secure 
sockets layers are the most common application of PKI. From our perspective, existing 
literature still does not explain important implementation areas for practitioners in the field. 
This article was developed to provide insights of PKI implementation in a government 
context and from a practitioner viewpoint. Our main motivation is to explain how PKI could 
be diffused in modern national identity management systems to outline and address 
appropriate security requirements. Our contributions are related to a PKI implementation 
model from one of the most pioneering governments in technology adoption in the Middle 
East.  
We believe that PKI deployment can evolve double the speed if adopted and owned by 
governments as trusted third parties. See also [27]. The role of the trusted third parties would 
be to verify the identities of the parties wishing to engage in a secure online communication. 
PKI, particularly in combination with smart ID cards, can provide robust user authentication 
and strong digital signatures. 
Existing PKI deployments have limited customers. The use of PKI in ID card schemes for 
example, would enjoy larger customer base. It is our belief that such systems have the 
potential to raise the awareness of both governments and citizens trust levels in electronic 
transactions with such advanced technologies. These technologies are thought to pave the way 
for government transformation from service delivery perspectives and introduce new 
communication and service delivery channels that should replace government traditional 
physical counter interactions. Successful PKI implementation cases would put higher 
pressures on both government officials and private sector to develop killer applications to 
revolutinsie public service sectors. In brief, this article does not intend to explain detailed 
implementation questions, although it can serve as a primer for government officials and 
researchers who are interested in PKI implementations in government sectors. 
4. THE UAE PKI PROJECT 
Emirates Identity Authority [28] is implementing PKI and a Federated Identity Management 
(FIM) solution to complement the existing identity management infrastructure and provide 
extended services to federal and local e-government authorities in the UAE.  The project aims 
to develop a comprehensive and intergraded security infrastructure to enable a primary 
service of confirmed digital identities of UAE ID card holders on digital networks; primarily 
on the internet.  
The project has two strategic objectives: (1) to enable verification of the cardholder's digital 
identity; (authentication services) by verifying PIN Code, biometric, and signature certificate 
and (2) provide credibility (validation services) through the development of a Central 
Certification Authority. See also Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2.  UAE PKI project primary objectives 
The PKI project will support the issuance of identity, digital signature and encryption 
certificates as well as key recovery for private keys associated with encryption certificates. It 
will also issue different types of certificates to support the requirements of other business 
sectors and communities.  An example of such custom certificates is attribute (role-based) 
certificates used for example by e-government, healthcare and justice sectors who may 
require their own role-based access control and administration such as the management of CA 
permissions, performing specific CA tasks, etc. 
Apart from issuing and managing digital certificates, the PKI project will enable business 
applications to use certificates by making available the proper means to validate PKI-based 
transactions. It will provide high levels of security infrastructure having the service integrity 
and assurances required to support the distribution and verification of public key certificates.  
We attempt to outline the three main components of the UAE Identity Management 
Infrastructure project related to G2C e-government:  
(1) issuance of smart cards as means to users authentication capability;  
(2) card readers and toolkit dissemination to enable smart card applications; and  
(3) the development of central certification authority to provide online validation 
services. 
These are discussed next. 
 
4.1. Smart Cards and Online Users Authentication 
Authentication is the process by which an entity identifies itself prior to network logon is 
permitted. Smart card authentication is one of the strongest user authentication mechanisms 
available today in the market.  Unlike ordinary cards like those used in banks, smart cards can 
defend themselves against unauthorized users as it uses complex and high level security 
measures. Smart cards are considered to represent a breakthrough solution for maximizing 
security, efficiency and interoperability in a wide range of e-government and e-commerce 
applications such as strong authentication, identity management, data management, customer 
support, and communications [29-33]. 
It is envisaged that the new smart ID card issued by the government to all citizen and resident 
population in the UAE and as part of the ID card scheme launched in mid-2005 will gradually 
be the only acceptable token to access e-government portals. Out of an estimated 8.2 million 
UAE population, more than 3.7 million people already posses smart ID cards, and it is 
planned that towards the end of 2014 all population will be enrolled. 
The latest generation of UAE smart ID cards (144K Contactless) contain multiple credentials, 
including unique RFID, MRZ barcode, photo ID, and biometric information (fingerprints), 
along with microprocessor and crypto keys and certificates. There are key primary services 
that can be provided by the UAE ID card in terms of e-government applications, some 
features of which are currently in use as explained next (See also Table 2). 
Table 2.  UAE ID Card Capabilities and Features Basic. 
 
 Trusted Personal Data: available in an electronic form which allows applications to 
capture data directly from the smart ID card chip. 
The integration of the capability of reading data electronically from the chip in some 
public sector applications have introduced significant contributions in terms of speed 
and accuracy and the elimination of the traditional ways of  data capture and entry 
procedures.  The use of the smart ID card for physical authentication and data capture 
has shortened for example the process cycle of service delivery at one public sector 
organizations (i.e., Dubai Courts) to less than 7 seconds from 7 to 10 minutes taken 
previously [34]. Similar success stories were repeated in many of the public sector 
organisations in the country that contributed to raising awareness of the smart card 
capabilities. 
 Multi-Factor Authentication: support varying strengths of authentication i.e., pin 
code, biometrics, digital certificates.  
The multi-factor authentication feature is a major capability that the ID card provides 
for e-government applications. For example, Abu Dhabi e-government portal [35] 
uses the UAE smart ID card to provide higher levels of assurance and confidence in 
the digital identities that interact with the portal.  A two factor authentication (PIN 
and Offline Certificate validation) capability of the ID card has been integrated to 
support and enhance the security for different e-service access models. 
 
 Digital Signature: personal digital certificates that allow users to digitally sign 
documents and applications. 
Data integrity and non-repudiation capability of signed documents and applications is 
another benefit.  Since access to the private key component needed to perform digital 
signatures is restricted to the person who possesses an ID card who has knowledge of 
its associated user PIN (and biometrics), it becomes increasingly difficult for an 
individual to later deny (repudiate) participation in transactions involving his or her 
digital signature. The digital signature is projected to replace the pen-and-ink 
signatures in both government and private sector transactions. This capability inserted 
into the card should also further support the development of e-government and e-
commerce environments. 
4.2. Smart Card Development Toolkit / Reader 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  ID Card Toolkit Functions 
To use a smart card in an e-government G2C environment, computers are needed to be 
equipped with smart card readers in order to enable the capabilities specified in section 3.1 
above. See also Figure 3. A software toolkit was developed to enable integration with e-
government applications which included smart card interface standard and the driver software 
used for managing the smart card and the card reader. In short, the smart card development 
toolkit aims to demystify the application of the smart card in e-government transactions, and 
also strengthen the understanding of all those involved in the planning and the execution of e-
government initiatives. 
From our research in the field, we noted that smart card manufacturers normally provide their 
own read and access communication protocols which may raise up some integration 
limitation issues.  Therefore, the development toolkit in the UAE was designed to be free of 
any proprietary features, and to allow a simple plug-and-play functionality from both the user 
and service provider perspectives.  The type of the reader terminal is dependent on the 
security access models specified by the service providers.  For instance, less sophisticated and 
cheaper card terminals are available if no biometric authentication is required. 
Overall, the developed toolkit was designed to support desktop, client-server, web 
applications and multiple development environments such as Java, C#, .Net. Figure 4 depicts 
the internal toolkit structure. See also Appendix-B for further information on the toolkit 
capabilities supported in offline and online modes. 
 Figure 4.  Toolkit Structure 
Having said this, the next section explores the major component of this article related to the 
implementation of a central certification authority in the country and its overall architecture 
that will be integrated with the above two components to enable online (stronger) credential 
authentication. 
3.4. Central Certification Authority 
The Central Certification Authority also referred to as the Government 
Root Certification Authority is intended to be the highest Certification Authority in the 
hierarchical structure of the Government Public Key Infrastructure in the UAE. The high 
level UAE PKI architecture depicted in Figure 5 will encompass a root and multiple certified 
subordinate CAs' to support own PKI policy and function. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Certifications Authorities Structures 
The architectural design of the certification authority infrastructure was discussed and refined 
at different business and technical levels with key stakeholders representing public and 
private sectors. The PKI management model was designed to complement existing security 
management practices followed by those involved in e-government and e-commerce 
initiatives by providing them with online validation services. As some e-government 
authorities required their own Certification Authority (CA), it was important for the 
implemented system to support such requirements. Figure 6 depicts the overall structure of 
the root CA. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Root CA Structure 
The PKI architecture was designed to support two operational models for the implementation 
of a third party sub CA.  In the first option, an e-government authority may implement its own 
CA including the required software and hardware infrastructure. It will rely on the same PKI 
infrastructure to certify its Public CA using own Root certificate. Figure 7 below illustrates 
this solution. 
 
Figure 7.  PKI Implementation option 1 
The second option assumes that a given e-government authority CA is setup as part of the 
same PKI infrastructure. A virtual partition is implemented on the Population CA. The e-
government CA will be initialized and configured on this new virtual partition. A virtual key 
container is created on the HSMs so that the Sub CA key pair and corresponding certificates 
are separated completely from the Root keys.  The solution of this second option is illustrated 
in Figure 8 below. 
 
Figure 8.  PKI Implementation option 2 
Deciding on which option to opt for depends entirely on the e-government authorities' 
requirements and their readiness to use or operate a PKI infrastructure. The first option meant 
no particular investments as e-government authorities would rely on the developed PKI 
infrastructure in the ID Card project to certify their CA public key with their Root CA.  The 
second option involved the implementation and operation of Sub CA by the same root CA 
authority. The Certificate Policy (CP) needed to be specified for the e-government CA and 
simply for any CAs certified by the Root CA. The CP which was specified by the Policy 
Authority described the requirements for the operation of the PKI and granting of PKI 
credentials as well as the lifetime management of those credentials.  
So in practice, after the completion of the authentication process which may include pin and 
biometrics verification, the transaction is checked for validity. At this stage, and depending on 
the available infrastructure, a local CRL and/or Certificate Repository database may be 
consulted. Another cross validation process could take place through connecting to the central 
certification authority to provide services of authentication and validation. A PKI based 
workflow depicted in Figure 9 explains how users carrying smart identity cards will interact 
within a PKI environment. 
 
Authentication                          Validation 
Figure 9.  Authentication and Validation (PKI) Workflow 
Having said this, the next section attempts to provide a short reflection on some key 
management considerations to provide guidance to government agencies contemplating the 
development and deployment of smart ID cards and PKI solutions. 
5. REFLECTION 
5.1. Issues related to scalability, operational costs, and integration 
Our research on PKI included the evaluation of various commercial software products 
available in the market. After rigorous benchmarks, the major components of the PKI solution 
were selected from leading international products. The following three issues needed careful 
attention: 
Scalability - The PKI functionality should scale well to handle millions of certificates 
and accommodate separate large-scale projects (such as the upcoming UAE biometric 
e-Passport project, e-Gate project at airports, e-Services project by the various e-
government authorities in the country, etc.).  
Operational Costs - Certificate Authorities and Repositories will need continual 
operations and maintenance, especially with the increased number of customers and 
large-scale projects to be supported. PKI structure options should pinpoint associated 
costs of operations and maintenance. 
Integration – Applications using PKI (i.e. PKI-enabled applications) shall integrate 
with central certification authority systems which shall answer the following 
questions: 
- What is the best integration model we can offer to PKI-enabled applications? 
- How can such integration with external applications be performed so that a 
high degree of security can be guaranteed against unauthorized access?  
Stavrou [36] identified five key risks associated with PKI implementation; trust 
establishment, private key protection, CRL availability, key generation, legislation 
compliance. Table 3 describes how these elements were addressed in the UAE project. 
Table 3.  Key security issues in PKI addressed in the UAE project. 
Key Risks Description 
Trust 
establishment 
The procedures followed to verify the individuals identities, before issuing identity 
certificates.  The issuance of certificates is linked with the ID card enrolment process. 
Individuals go through vivid registration process that includes: biographical data 
capture, portrait, fingerprint biometrics capture, verification with civil and forensic 
biometric databases, biographical data verification with the Ministry of Interior's 
database and other black-listed lists. The certification revocation procedures are 
linked mainly with Ministry of Interior's database and strict policies and procedures. 
Private key 
protection 
The infrastructure is hosted in a highly secure physical location, that is ISO 27001 
certified.  
CRL 
availability 
A list of serial numbers of all the digital certificates that have been cancelled; CRL 
(Certification Revocation List) to allow other institutes verify the status of any 
presented digital certificate, is designed for 24/7 availability and to maintain a strong 
and secure architecture to avoid security breaches and a comprehensive fail-over plan 
that provides a secondary in infrastructure to maintain availability of services in the 
case of failure of the primary infrastructure. 
Key 
generation 
Public and private keys of the certifying authority are generated using proprietary 
cryptographic algorithms. The user certificates are generated using market standard 
cryptographic algorithms. The technical key lengths are 2048, where as the user keys 
are 4096. 
Legislation 
compliance 
The government is currently working on developing the legal framework to recognise 
the operation of the PKI and the usage of digital certificates and digital signatures. 
International guidelines concerning PKI are being consulted such as (EU Electronic 
Signatures Directive, EU Data Protection Directive). 
The UAE government issued a low on electronic transactions, however here is not 
legal act concerning the usage of digital certificates and signatures. 
 
5.2. Management Involvement: Shifting the Focus from PKI as a Technology to a 
Business Enabler 
The adoption of PKI has the potential to deliver significant benefits to many sectors including 
e-Government, healthcare and banking. However, for such adoption to happen, it was 
important to understand and appreciate the business value, business requirements and 
business integration issues [37] relevant to potential PKI customers in the above mentioned 
example sectors. 
As part of our strategy to implement a nation-wide PKI, it was seen important to consult 
potential customers across many sectors including e-government authorities both on the 
federal and local levels. In doing so, potential customers would see the benefits of PKI as a 
business enabler. We paid much attention to collect the necessary business requirements that 
would help tightening the future PKI functional requirements. See also Appendix-C. 
Undoubtedly, deployment of a functioning PKI is extremely difficult in practice [7,8,36-38]. 
Weak understanding of the PKI technology by top management and lack of qualified 
resources in the field will always be a challenging factor. Before we reached to a consensus 
on the PKI design and functions, there was much confusion about the full scope of this 
project.   
We noted that practitioners in the field of government identity management systems who are 
interested in PKI applications have deep-seated narrowed focus when thinking about such 
technologies. They tend to limit their focus purely on PKI services such as digital certification 
and electronic signatures in the context of e-government and e-commerce, without much 
comprehension of how PKI could be integrated with their business needs and practices. The 
aggressive marketing promises by private sector consultants and vendors have contributed 
somehow to some misconceptions in the minds of government officials of PKI applications. 
Management involvement was important in some of the regular review meetings that required 
restating project objectives in a user friendly terms. It was common for the technical teams in 
the project to fell victims of technical-driven discussions and away from the global business 
objectives. It was important to remind the teams to reflect the interests of stakeholders in the 
government rather than just the interest of the implementing organization.   
From a management standpoint, we tried to stop attempts of innovation as people tend to act 
sometimes in complex projects, and keep them focused on the business requirements, and the 
overall PKI functions. Stakeholders on the other hand needed several awareness sessions of 
the scope and deliverables of the project. It was important to visualize and present cases of 
how their applications will be integrated with PKI, and highlighting the immediate benefits. 
High attention was given to the development of Government-2-Citizen PKI enabled 
applications. 
 
 
5.3. Implementation Approach 
An agile but incremental phased implementation approach was followed, that emphasized the 
delivery of functionalities that could meet the immediate demands of local e-government 
authorities. The earlier workshops concentrated on discussing and refining business and 
technical requirements with the relevant stakeholders.  
Specific attention was given to the development of the interfaces required to integrate the ID 
card system with the PKI solution, and allowing at the same time, agreement among the 
stakeholders on business and technical requirements. This allowed e-government authorities 
to experiment the authentication capabilities offered by the ID card including the online 
validation process. 
This allowed the different groups in the organization to concentrate on the other building 
blocks of the PKI project, as they were running in parallel; such as technical workshops 
related to integration needs, testing, documentation, enforcement of policies, guidelines and 
compliance, digital signature laws, etc. 
5.4. PKI Workflow and Lifecycle 
It was important that we go through the full lifecycles of digital certificate-based identities, 
and how encryption, digital signature and certificate authentication capabilities are mapped to 
business needs and translated into real applications. See also [37,38].  It was also important to 
set clear procedures to handle smart card life cycle management requirements; renewal, 
replacement, revocation, unlocking, and the overall helpdesk and user support requirements. 
Another issue that was considered in the PKI workflow was related to the incremental size of 
the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) which must be maintained and updated for proper 
validation of each transaction which occurs using the ID card certificate. An unverified 
transaction can provide important information or access for a potential intrusion. Thus, CRL 
is a significant security flaw in the operation of the PKI, and the maintenance of this list is 
one of the most strenuous challenges facing any CA.  
The list of revoked certificates was envisaged to be well over multi gigabytes of size, and 
searching the list for invalid certificates will result in long delays as it will force some 
applications to forego a comprehensive check before carrying out a given transaction.  
Therefore, a Positive Certification List (PCL) was also implemented to avoid this challenge in 
the future. 
5.5. Legal Framework 
It was important that the PKI deployment is associated with a legal framework to regulate the 
electronic authentication environment and support the provision of online services in the 
public sector. See also [39]. The following items were key preparation issues addressed 
through intergovernmental working groups:  
1. Well-documented Certificate Policies (CPs) and Certification Practice 
Statements (CPSs). CPs and CPSs are tools that help establish trust relationships 
between the PKI provider, the subscribers (end-users) and relying parties (i.e. 
implementers of PKI-enabled applications). 
2. PKI assessment and accreditation were seen as an important trust anchor, as it will 
determine compliance to defined criteria of trustworthiness and quality. Such 
assessment and audit was set as a prerequisite to be included in the trusted root CAs 
program. As part of the implementation of the future PKI applications, it was 
recommended that an assessment of the existing Certificate Policies (CPs) is 
conducted. This resulted in RFC 2527 compliant CPs and CPSs [40]. 
3. A digital signature law that would define the meaning of an e-signature in the legal 
context. The law needed to recognize a digital signature in signed electronic contracts 
and documents as legally binding as a paper-based contracts. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Public Key Infrastructure has proven itself invaluable in e-government and e-commerce 
environments despite the complexity and associated risks that may stem from its application.  
We observe that many of the current PKI projects have limited applications in e-government 
domain because it is mainly sponsored and managed by private sector organizations. Telecom 
companies in many countries in the Middle East region for example have implemented PKI 
systems but face challenges to expanding their limited user community. 
Establishing and using a government based certification authority, would logically acquire 
higher levels of trust in the certificate issuance process and in the identities of the recipients 
of the certificates. The integration of PKI into central government identity management 
systems is believed to support the diffusion and acceleration of e-government progress, that 
is, the provision of citizen services and outreach over digital networks. The presented case 
study of the UAE PKI project and the approach the government has followed to integrate it 
part of its federal identity management system, was aimed to share knowledge and improve 
understanding of government practices in the field. 
Assessment of the success of this proposed structure was beyond the scope of this article, as 
the implementation was undergoing during the preparation of this article. However, it will be 
published in a separate article once the full implementation is complete. 
Without a doubt, the maturity of e-government requires significant efforts by both 
practitioners and researchers to support the development of horizontal and vertical e-
government integration [41-43].  Governments need to prepare themselves to introduce social 
changes of work roles, attitudes and new competence needs.  Governments are seen to be the 
entity responsible to lay down and develop the foundation of digital identities.   
PKI remains a crucial component to provide higher security levels in digital forms, and will 
have a triple effect if integrated with the existing government trusted identity management 
systems. As the adoption of PKI in government projects is likely to continue, opportunities 
exist for future researchers to examine the success of such implementations. 
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APPENDIX-A:  MAJOR PKI PROJECTS WORLDWIDE   
1. ICAO PKD (International Civil Aviation Organization Public Key Directory) 
This is a global PKI directory implementation for achieving interoperable ePassports worldwide. 
The key benefit of this project is the PKI Validation of ePassport. 
This project allows border control authorities to confirm that: 
 The ePassport document held by the traveler was issued by a bonafide authority. 
 The biographical and biometric information endorsed in the document at issuance has not 
subsequently been altered. 
 Provided active authentication and / or chip authentication is supported by the ePassport, 
the electronic information in the document is not a copy (ie clone). 
 If the document has been reported lost or has been cancelled, the validation check can 
help confirm whether the document remains in the hands of the person to whom it was 
issued. 
 
 
2. SWIFT – PKI at application level (SWIFTNet PKI), and another PKI at network level 
(VPN) 
SWIFT‟s public key infrastructure (SWIFTNet PKI) service issues digital certificates to financial 
institutions and corporates, thereby enabling a trusted, provable and confidential end-to-end 
communication over SWIFTNet. 
In addition SWIFT‟s VPN PKI issues certificates to its network infrastructure to secure all network 
traffic using VPN protocols. 
 
 
3. European TLIST of the 27 Member States  
On 16 October 2009 the European Commission adopted a Decision setting out measures 
facilitating the use of procedures by electronic means through the „points of single contact‟ under 
the Services Directive. One of the measures adopted by the Decision consisted in the obligation for 
Member States to establish and publish by 28. 12.2009 their Trusted List of supervised/accredited 
certification service providers issuing qualified certificates to the public. The objective of this 
obligation is to enhance cross-border use of electronic signatures by increasing trust in electronic 
signatures originating from other Member States. The Decision was updated several times since 
16.10.2009, the last amendment was made on 28.7.2010 
The EU Trusted Lists benefits above all to the verification of advanced e-signatures supported by 
qualified certificates in the meaning of the e-signature directive (1999/93/EC) as far as they have 
to include at least certification service providers issuing qualified certificates. Member States can 
however include in their Trusted Lists also other certification service providers. 
Member States had to establish and publish their Trusted List by 28.12.2009 at least in a “human 
readable” form but were free to produce also a "machine processable" form which allowed for 
automated information retrieval. In order to allow access to the trusted lists of all Member States in 
an easy manner, the European Commission has published a central list with links to national 
"trusted lists" 
 (https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/esignature/trusted-list/tl-hr.pdf).  
 
 
4. ERCA (European Root Certification Authority) 
The main ERCA deliverables are the Member State Authority [MSA] policy review and the Key 
generation for Member State Authority CAs. During an ERCA signing session, countries receive 
the symmetric and asymmetric encryption keys for use by their Member State Authority. 
The Member State Authorities will issue certificates on smart cards required for the operations of 
the tachograph which a device that records a vehicle's speed over time, monitor driver‟s working 
hours and ensure that appropriate breaks are taken. 
 
5. TSCP PKI (Transatlantic Secure Collaboration Program) 
TSCP program involves leading aerospace & defense companies in the USA and Europe including 
Boeing, BAE Systems, EADS, Lockheed-Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and Rolls-Royce. 
Supporting Governments include the US DoD, the UK MoD and the Government of Canada. 
The challenge addressed by TSCP PKI is the increasing reliance on the electronic creation, 
transmission and manipulation of information in order to meet schedule and efficiency objectives. 
The emerging business environment requires that this occur with an international workforce 
subject to multiple jurisdictions. This presents significant business risk to the companies involved, 
in terms of compliance with national laws and regulations on data transfer, increased complexity of 
governance and oversight, and IT security. 
The TSCP PKI represents the bridge CA that allows interoperability between the program 
members CAs. 
 
6. FBCA - US Federal bridge CA  
The main objective of this bridge CA is to provide one CA for cross-certification between main 
CAs in the US and avoid complicated mesh cross-certification. FBCA is designed to create trust 
paths among individual PKIs. It employs a distributed and not a hierarchical model. 
The FPKISC, Federal Public Key Infrastructure Steering Committee, oversees FBCA development 
and operations including documentation, enhancements and client-side software. The FBCA 
operates in accordance with FPKI Policy Authority and FPKISC directions. 
FBCA is in charge of propagating policy information to certificate users and maintain a PKI 
directory online 24 X 7 X 365. 
 
 
APPENDIX-B: TOOLKIT CAPABILITIES 
Toolkit 
Function 
Require Secure 
Messaging? 
Require Online Validation Service from EIDA? What kind of validation is 
required? 
Read Public 
Data 
No No Public data files (read from the card) are 
signed. The Toolkit function “Read 
Public Data” verifies the signature on 
these file as part of the reading process. 
The verification process happens locally 
on the end user environment and as such 
it is an offline process that does not 
require any online additional service from 
EIDA.   
Authentication 
(with PKI) 
Yes 
 
The justification is as 
follows: 
 Firstly, the authentication 
process involves the PKI 
applet where the 
authentication key pair 
(and corresponding 
certificate) is stored 
 The ID card (actually the 
PKI applet) requires PIN 
verification prior to 
authorizing the usage of 
the authentication key pair.  
 PIN verification requires 
secure messaging with the 
PKI applet. 
PKI authentication requires the following steps: 
 
- Secure Messaging with the PKI applet 
- PIN Verification 
- Authentication process through which the cardholder authenticate 
certificate is validated. 
 
Establishing a Secure Messaging with the PKI applet of the ID card 
does not require being online with EIDA. This is due to the fact that 
the SAGEM PKI DLL part of the Toolkit contains the keys that 
enable establishing a Secure Messaging with the PKI applet locally 
(offline process).  
 
Regarding certificate validation, EMIRATES ID does as part of the 
PKI solution an online service (OCSP) that offers real time 
verification of certificate status. Whether the Service Provider 
business application will use this service depends basically on their 
will to rely all the time on an online service for certification 
validation. The alternative for them would be to download CRLs 
Authentication certificate validation is a 
pre-requisite to complete the 
authentication process. Two modes are 
available for certification validation: 
 
1. Using CRLs: in this case, CRLs are 
downloaded by the business application 
regularly. However the actual 
processing of certificate validation is an 
offline process that happens locally on 
the end-user‟s environment. 
 
2. Using EMIRATES ID OCSP server: 
This is an online service that relieves 
the business application from the 
complex processing of CRLs and 
provides real time validation of 
certificate revocation status. 
frequently from the CA repository and to process certificate and 
CRLs locally (offline process).  
Biometric 
Match-Off-
Card 
Yes 
 
The Match-Off-Card requires 
reading the fingerprint from 
the ID card which is 
protected data that requires 
Secure Messaging with the 
ID Applet.  
It depends on the business application architecture and deployment 
channel. The possible options are as follows: 
 
1. The business application is offered as an online service (e.g. 
ADSIC e-services portal, e-services kiosks). In this case, the 
business application relies on an online service from EMIRATES 
ID that enables setting a Secure Messaging session with the ID 
applet.  
 
2. The business application is deployed on user sites (e.g. 
municipalities) that are visited by end-users. The application 
deployed on user sites has a dedicated SAM device connected to it. 
Therefore Secure Messaging with the ID applet can be established 
using the SAM. The process is offline and does not require online 
connectivity to EIDA.  
 
3. The business application is deployed on alternative channel such as 
kiosks. The kiosk would have an integrated SAM device and the 
processing is therefore offline and is similar to the 2nd point above. 
 
4. The business application is deployed on standalone/offline devices 
such as Handhelds with integrated SAM. 
No validation is required as part of the 
Off-Card-Biometric apart from 
performing the actual verification process 
that involves the fingerprint template read 
from the ID card. The verification 
happens locally on the end-user 
environment and does not require online 
connectivity to EIDA. 
Biometric 
Match-On-
Card 
Yes.  
 
The Match-On-Card requires 
an interaction with the MOC 
applet of the ID card. The 
overall process for Match-
On-Card can be summarized 
as follows: 
 
1. Setup a Secure Messaging 
Session with the MOC 
By definition, the Match-On-card process is an offline process that 
shall not require online connectivity to EIDA. Therefore, the MOC 
process is typically used in situations where the business application 
has a connected SAM. Examples of such a deployment would be: 
 
1. The business application is deployed on user sites (e.g. 
municipalities) that are visited by end-users. The application 
deployed on user sites has a dedicated SAM device connected to it. 
Therefore Secure Messaging with the MOC applet can be 
established using the SAM.  
 
No validation is required as part of the 
On-Card-Biometric apart from performing 
the actual verification process that 
happens locally on the end-user 
environment and does not require online 
connectivity to EIDA. 
Applet of the ID card 
 
2. Perform the actual MOC 
verification after capturing 
the end-user fingerprint  
2. The business application is deployed on standalone devices such as 
Handhelds with integrated SAM.  
Digital 
(Transaction ) 
Signature  
Yes.  
 
Justification is similar to the 
Authentication process with 
PKI.  
The digital signature verification process by the business application 
involves the following steps: 
 
1. Signature Verification 
2. Certificate Path Build 
3. Certificate Path validation (where certification revocation status is 
checked) 
 
EMIRATES ID offers 2 online services to business partners. 
 
- Online certificate validation through the OCSP server. The 
discussion on this is similar to the one provided for the 
Authentication process with PKI (see Authentication entry).  
 
- Online Signature Validation: In this case the whole signature 
verification process is outsourced to EIDA.  
Authentication certificate validation is a 
pre-requisite to complete the 
authentication process. The two modes 
discussed under Authentication with PKI 
are application (see Authentication entry 
above). 
 
If the business partner decides to use 
EMIRATES ID online service for 
signature validation, then this requires an 
online connectivity to EIDA. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX-C:  SUMMARY OF BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS AND PKI FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Challenges Opportunities Description Concept  
 Lack of support from 
Stakeholders 
 EMIRATES ID being the 
main PKI provider in the 
UAE and the recognized 
one for eGovernment 
projects 
 EMIRATES ID becomes a 
revenue driven 
organization  
EMIRATES ID is already managing the PKI for the 
eID card issuing project (i.e. population CA). This PKI 
will be upgraded including the implementation of 
validation services (CRL, OCSP). Future UAE 
eGovernment PKI projects will take advantage of the 
new PKI to be implemented by EIDA. Finally, existing 
EMIRATES ID PKI applications (including the eID 
card issuing project) will be migrated to the future 
EMIRATES ID PKI. 
Only CAs 
operated by 
EMIRATES ID 
are recognized by 
stakeholders in 
the eGovernment 
sector. 
EMIRATES ID 
as the PKI 
provider for the 
UAE e-
Government 
 More operational and 
infrastructural 
requirements 
 EMIRATES 
IDdiversifying into a 
business stream unrelated 
to EMIRATES IDcore 
business   
 Establish EMIRATES ID 
credibility as the trusted 
PKI provider in the UAE 
 An additional revenue 
stream for EIDA 
EMIRATES ID will offer Managed PKI services aimed 
at enterprises planning to establish a Certification 
Authority (CA) for addressing their particular business 
needs. Organizations that might be interested in such 
services are banks and governmental organizations 
(e.g. healthcare, education).  Also EMIRATES ID can 
cross-certify (acting as a root) other CAs. 
EMIRATES ID to 
cross-certify other 
government and 
commercial CAs 
and to offer 
managed PKI 
services for these. 
Offering 
Managed PKI 
services 
 Maintaining and backing 
up keys is a liability issue 
and additional operation 
overhead 
 Encryption tend to be 
seen as a threat to 
national security 
 Full range of certificate 
types offered to 
EMIRATES ID potential 
customers 
 Support the eID card 
issuing project in case 
encryption certificates are 
needed 
EMIRATES ID can establish CA for encryption 
certificate issuing with key escrow. Each encryption 
key pair will be issued under the control of the 
certificate holder of the organization to which he 
belongs. 
EMIRATES ID 
PKI to support 
issuing encryption 
certificates with 
key backup 
Supporting 
encryption 
certificates 
 Eventually additional 
CAs and CPs to manage 
 Support PKI-enabling in 
the UAE by providing 
certificates that fulfill the 
requirements of different 
sectors 
 Full range of certificate 
types offered to 
EMIRATES ID potential 
customers 
 Additional revenue streams 
EMIRATES ID PKI will support issuing and managing 
different types of certificates such as certificates for: 
 VPN devices 
 Web servers (SSL certificates) 
 Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol 
(SCEP) devices 
 Attribute (role-based) certificates  
 Certificates for professionals (e.g. doctors) 
 Anonymity certificates (e.g. by omitting first 
and last names from the certificate)  
EMIRATES ID PKI will offer the enrolment methods 
needed to issues these types of certificates by the 
relevant organizations. 
PKI to support the 
issuance of multi 
purpose 
certificates 
Supporting 
multi purpose 
certificates 
 Citizen reaction to be 
legally liable for digitally 
signing documents 
 Promote digital signature 
and eID card usage in the 
UAE 
 Establish EMIRATES ID 
as the regulatory authority 
EMIRATES ID will define an e-Signature law that will 
define the legal framework for electronic signature as 
well as set EMIRATES ID as the regulatory authority 
(root CA) accrediting and certifying other 
organizations. 
promote 
electronic 
signatures law 
Promote 
electronic 
signatures law 
responsible for the secure 
PKI usage in the UAE 
 Time-stamping servers 
rely on the availability of 
a trusted time source (e.g. 
NTP server) 
 Time-stamping is an 
online service, therefore 
EMIRATES ID need to 
adhere to SLAs defined 
for its customers   
 Enforcing non-repudiation 
services (long-term validity 
of e-documents) 
 Additional revenue stream 
 Establish EMIRATES ID 
position as the trusted PKI 
provider in the UAE 
The time-stamping services will allow EMIRATES ID 
enforcing and offering non-repudiation services so that 
a signature remains valid long-term after it has been 
created. Time-stamping general added-value is to 
provide an irrefutable proof that a document existed at 
a certain point in time. 
provide trusted 
time-stamping 
service (RFC 
3161-compliant) 
 
(RFC 3161 is 
Time-stamping 
protocol) 
Trusted Time-
stamping 
 OCSP is an online 
service, therefore 
EMIRATES ID need to 
adhere to SLAs defined 
for its customers 
  
 Timely access to certificate 
revocation status 
information 
 Easier PKI-enabling 
compared to relying on 
CRLs only 
 Eventually additional 
revenue streams 
 Simpler integration models 
with e-Government 
projects 
 Establish EMIRATES ID 
position as the trusted PKI 
provider in the UAE 
OCSP allows providing timely secure information on 
certificate revocation status. 
 
to support Online 
Certificate Status 
Protocol (OCSP) 
Online 
Validation 
Services 
 additional operation costs 
for EIDA 
 relatively complex IS 
 Operating the LTA might 
be out of scope for 
EMIRATES ID as e-
Identity authority 
 Enforcing long-term non-
repudiation services offered 
by EIDA 
 Additional revenue stream 
 Establish EMIRATES ID 
position as the trusted PKI 
provider in the UAE 
EMIRATES ID will provide/promote long-term 
archive services (LTA) which will enable the 
preservation of data integrity over the time. The LTA 
service will be particularly useful with signed 
documents whose validity shall be preserved over time. 
to 
provide/promote 
long-term archive 
services (LTA) 
Long-term 
Archive Services 
(LTA) 
 Typically e-Notaries 
applications are bespoke 
 No successful 
 Facilitating and enabling 
trusted e-commerce 
transactions 
An e-notary is a PKI based application that allows 
adding trust in digital transactions (i.e. such as e-
commerce transactions). Such services provides 
E-Notary services 
promoted/provide
d by EIDA 
E-Notary 
services 
implementation (e.g. 
lessons learned) 
worldwide so far  
 Current e-commerce law 
does not define what an 
e-Notary stands for 
 Lack of adoption of e-
commerce implies the 
lack of adoption of an e-
Notary application 
 Additional revenue stream 
for EIDA 
guarantee to the parties involved in the transaction that 
they can trust each other and provides the proofs 
needed to establish that a transaction took place. 
Potential customers for such services are e-Justice and 
e-Commerce sectors. 
 Lack of IT knowledge 
among citizens 
 Existing PCs park not 
supporting the 
installation of the 
package to be installed 
by the citizen 
 Expensive operation in 
case EMIRATES ID 
targets additional 
platforms (e.g. UNIX) 
other than Microsoft 
Windows 
 Flooding of the 
EMIRATES ID helpdesk 
when the roll-out of this 
package starts 
 Simple adoption of PKI 
and eID card by citizens 
and residents  
 Promote the usage of the 
eID card within the UAE 
 Strengthen the position of 
EMIRATES ID as the 
promoter of the eID card in 
the UAE 
 Promoting the upgrade of 
the existing PCs park in the 
UAE 
To support using of PKI, EMIRATES ID will create 
and provide a package that will facilitate the 
installation of everything needed for using the eID card 
by the cardholder.  
 
will provide an 
eID starter kit 
eID starter kit 
for citizens 
(certificate 
holders) 
 The toolkit is useless if 
EMIRATES ID does not 
target the right platforms 
 Lack of EMIRATES ID 
experienced staff to 
support the organizations 
using the kit 
 Quick adoption of PKI by 
relying parties (i.e. by the 
implementers of 
 Trigger for EMIRATES ID 
to implement a fully-
fledged PKI in 
development environment 
to service PKI applications 
implementers  
As opposed to the eID starter kit used by citizens, the 
eID development kit will be used by whoever will be 
interested in developing eID and PKI enabled 
applications. The kit includes code samples, APIs, 
access to EMIRATES ID test PKI infrastructure, 
sample eID cards, etc. 
EMIRATES ID 
will provide an 
eID development 
kit for eID (e.g. 
PKI) applications 
developers 
eID 
development kit 
 Additional revenue stream 
for EIDA 
 Testing applications 
requires lots of skills 
(including PKI, eID and 
testing skills). People 
having these skills shall 
be available 
 Liability issue for 
EMIRATES ID in case 
security holes are found 
in some applications (that 
did receive type approval 
from EIDA) 
 Enable the implementation 
of secure eID-enabled 
applications 
 Build confidence of 
citizens (eID card holders) 
in business applications 
using the ID card 
 Establish EMIRATES ID 
position as the trusted party 
around eID-enabling 
EMIRATES ID will help the developers of eID 
applications promoting their applications. This includes 
testing and the type approval of their applications so 
that they get accredited as authorized to process eID 
cards. 
Third party PKI 
and eID 
application 
certification 
Third party PKI 
modules/applica
tion type 
approval (i.e. 
certification) 
 Citizens may find that 
such service is a threat 
against their privacy 
 Liability issue for 
EMIRATES ID in case a 
threat agent breaks into 
one mailbox 
 Lack of adoption by 
citizens unless the 
service is mandatory 
 Business case application 
for using the eID card 
 Promoting G2C and B2C 
markets 
 Additional income streams 
 Government being closer to 
citizens  
 New business stream for 
commercial organizations 
Such service would allow each citizen/resident to have 
a certified mailbox (of the form 
firstname.lastname@mymailbox.ae) where we would 
receive official courier from governmental 
organization. The mailbox could also be used to 
receive any useful courier (including bills, etc). 
EMIRATES ID to 
implement and 
operate a certified 
mailbox service 
Certified 
mailbox service 
 The Validation Gateway 
can be seen as a single 
point of attacks by threat 
agents 
 The validation gateway 
being developed without 
thinking the right 
integration interfaces 
with eID enabled 
applications 
 Support post-issuance 
personalization of eID 
cards 
 Providing a trusted gateway 
responsible for providing a 
blacklist of revoked cards 
 Easier integration models 
between EMIRATES ID 
and eID applications 
implementers 
The Validation Gateway maintains a “hotlist” of cards 
that has been temporarily or permanently blocked. 
Such service could be useful for specific public 
services such as police and kiosks. The Validation 
Gateway is also needed in case EMIRATES ID 
implements Post Issuance Personalization (PIP) of card 
applications. 
Implement an 
access control 
server for eID 
cards 
Card Validation 
Gateway 
 
 
